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INTRODUCTION 
On June 28, 2012, the Supreme Court of the United 
States issued its decision in National Federation of 
Independent Business (“NFIB”) v. Sebelius, perhaps better 
known as the Affordable Care Act (ACA) opinion.1  Chief 
Justice Roberts authored the Court’s 5-4 decision, sustaining 
the ACA in its entirety save one exception.2  The Court ruled 
that Congress did not have the power to revoke a state’s 
existing Medicaid funding as a penalty for that state refusing 
to participate in the ACA’s Medicaid expansion provisions.3  
Chief Justice Roberts agreed with the dissenting Justices’ 
conclusion that the individual mandate to purchase health 
insurance exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause power.4  
And although many Court-watchers anticipated that such a 
finding would ring the death knell for the constitutionality of 
the entire ACA, the Chief’s willingness to characterize the 
individual mandate as a tax rather than a penalty for 
purposes of determining its constitutionality allowed the 
Court to hold that the mandate was a constitutional exercise 
of Congress’s power to tax.5
With respect to the ACA’s other hotly contested 
provision—the requirement that States expand their 
Medicaid coverage to continue receiving Medicaid funding—
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion determined that Congress had 
gone too far.
 
6  The Medicaid expansion provision operated like 
a “gun to the head” of the states, and coercion on such a level 
violates the Constitution.7  Nevertheless, Chief Justice 
Roberts, joined by four other justices, held that the Court 
could and must sever the Medicaid expansion provision from 
the Act, to leave the remainder in place as valid law.8
 
 1. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 
 2. Id. at 2608. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 2598 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“Congress shall have 
Power . . . [t]o regulate [c]ommerce . . . among the several States . . . .”)). 
 5. See id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“Congress shall have [p]ower 
[t]o lay and collect taxes . . . .”)). 
 6. Id. at 2633–40 (Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Breyer and 
Kagan, concluded that the Medicaid expansion was constitutionally 
impermissible because the expansion permitted revocation of a State’s existing 
Medicaid funding if they declined to comply with the expansion.). 
 7. See id. at 2604–05. 
 8. Id. at 2638–42 (Roberts, C.J., for the Court, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, 
Sotomayor, & Kagan, JJ.). 
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The ACA plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions 
are full of history lessons, health care statistics, insurance 
argot, economic theories, and metaphors ranging from the 
bellicose to the agricultural.  However, the ACA decision is 
not about cost-shifting, or healthcare services or the 
healthcare market, or even about broccoli.9
There are two dominant federalism narratives, one 
grounded in sovereignty, the other in cooperation.
  It is about power.  
Specifically, it is about the protean allocation of decision-
making power that gives life to American constitutional 
federalism and the dualistic tension between the Federal 
Government and the individual states. 
10  
Sovereignty federalism posits that state autonomy is 
inviolable.11  Advocates of this narrative argue that the 
success of federalism depends on strict adherence to the idea 
that the federal and state governments occupy separate 
regulatory spheres.12  By contrast, cooperative federalism13 
emphasizes integration over autonomy.14  Supporters of this 
narrative cast the states in a passive role as compliant 
implementers of federal policy.15
 
 9. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. 
v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 866 (2012) (No.11-398). 
  Recent scholarship has 
explored more nuanced versions of cooperative federalism, 
arguing that states, though subordinate in this 
“master/servant” construction, can exploit their servant role 
 10. More recently, scholars have initiated a conversation about a third 
theory of federalism known as “dynamic” federalism.  This scholarship 
focuses on the mechanisms that states can access to negotiate regulatory 
implementation and protect themselves from national breaches of state 
sovereignty.  See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. 
REV. 863 (2006); Kirsten Engle, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism 
in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 176  (2006) (Dynamic federalism is 
“the recognition and even celebration, of real-world overlap and dynamic 
relationship between the state and federal authority.”); J.B. Ruhl & James 
Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the 
Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59 (2010). 
 11. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1492–96, 1498–1512 (1987) (book review). 
 12. Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 
1553–54 (2012). 
 13. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative 
Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” 
Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998) (evaluating of cooperative federalism). 
 14. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 
118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1262 (2009). 
 15. Id. 
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through dissent, thereby exerting power and influence in the 
federal policymaking process.16
Sovereignty federalism and cooperative federalism 
represent the two dominant federalism narratives among 
Supreme Court justices and scholars.  The Court consistently 
invokes formal protections to safeguard the states’ right to 
preside over their own empires.
  Federalism along this model, 
however, inverts the power relationship that is central to the 
sovereignty narrative.  That is, cooperative federalism, unlike 
sovereignty federalism, assumes that the Federal 
Government is preeminent and that the states, while given 
the freedom to dissent and impede through uncooperative 
methods, do not so much share power as react to it. 
17  Sovereignty scholars tend 
to embrace this dualistic vision of federalism that locates 
federalism’s success in the state’s ability to exercise supreme 
policymaking authority within its own sphere of influence 
without federal interference.18  By contrast, academics that 
lean toward cooperative federalism locate the states’ power in 
their position as federal servants, not separate sovereigns.19  
Scholars have commented that even though these academics 
tend to resist the rigid de jure “separate spheres” approach, 
their de facto autonomy theories nevertheless reinforce the 
basic sovereignty notion that states possess distinct identities 
that allow them to function as sites of decision making 
power.20  In this Article, I attempt to enter the conversation 
begun by others who argue that a polyphonic theory may 
allow us to better understand contemporary federalism.21
 
 16. See, e.g., id.; see also Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: 
The Value of State-based Dissent to Federal Health Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
111 (2011). 
  To 
 17. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 18. Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 
1553–54 (2012). 
 19. See Heather K. Gerken, Of Sovereigns and Servants, 115 YALE L.J. 
2633, 2635 (2006).  See, e.g., Daniel J. Elazar, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW 
FROM THE STATES 162 (2d ed. 1972); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Cooperative 
Federalism and Co-optation, 92 YALE L.J. 1344, 1346 (1983); Philip J. Weiser, 
Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. 
REV. 663, 668 (2001). 
 20. Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. 
L. REV. 4, 13 (2009) (“Even as scholars have rejected a sovereignty account, they 
remain haunted by its ghost.  They continue to deploy narratives about power, 
jurisdiction, and identity that mirror those of sovereignty’s champions.”). 
 21. See Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 
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that end, this Article discusses the defects of sovereignty 
federalism and cooperative federalism, both of which are (1) 
subspecies of the Court’s long-standing dualist approach to 
federalism, and (2) given expression in the Court’s ACA 
opinions. 
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in NFIB v. Sebelius mimics 
the sovereignty narrative.22  It privileges the concept of dual 
federalism as inherited from those original framers of the 
Constitution who distrusted centralized power.23  His analysis 
of the federal-state relationship emanates from a strict 
adherence to protecting structural federalism by preserving 
formalistic boundaries of state autonomy.24  Conversely, 
Justice Ginsburg’s concurring opinion is a robust defense of 
cooperative federalism.25
 
IOWA L. REV. 243, 248–49, 285–96 (2005). 
  Her power allocation analysis 
favors the Federal Government on all counts, implicitly 
affirming the subordinate function of the states as mere 
In the polyphonic conception, federalism is characterized by the 
existence of multiple, independent sources of political authority. 
The scope of this political authority is defined by territory, not by 
subject matter. No kind of conduct is categorically beyond the 
boundaries of state or federal jurisdiction. The federal and state 
governments function as alternative centers of power. In the first 
instance, any matter is presumptively within the authority of the 
federal government and of a state government. Full concurrent 
power is the norm. A polyphonic conception of federalism thus 
resists the idea of defining enclaves of state power protected 
federal intrusion. . . . [P]olyphonic federalism rejects the dualist 
vestiges of dual federalism. 
Id. at 285.  
 22. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 23. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 24. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578.  
(“‘State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: Rather, federalism secures to 
citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.’  
Because the police power is controlled by 50 different States instead of one 
national sovereign, the facets of governing that touch on citizens’ daily lives are 
normally administered by smaller governments closer to the governed.  The 
Framers thus ensured that powers which ‘in the ordinary course of affairs, 
concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people’ were held by 
governments more local and more accountable than a distant federal 
bureaucracy. The independent power of the States also serves as a check on the 
power of the Federal Government: ‘By denying any one government complete 
jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, federalism protects the liberty of 
the individual from arbitrary power.’ ” ) (internal citations omitted). 
 25. Id. at 2609–42 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
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implementers of federal programs.26  Underscoring Justice 
Ginsburg’s rationale is the idea that the Federal Government 
is empowered to address problems of collective action 
affecting multiple states.27  While Justice Ginsburg’s opinion 
reads as less anachronistic than Chief Justice Roberts’, it 
nevertheless remains stuck in a bygone era, namely the New 
Deal, when the exigencies of the Depression—and the states’ 
widespread inability to address those exigencies—forced the 
Federal Government to take control of so many aspects of 
American political and economic life.28
Despite their differences as to where power originates 
and resides, how it is imposed, and who exercises it over 
whom, sovereignty federalism and cooperative federalism 
have one critical component in common: they express the 
relationship between the Federal Government and the states 
in terms of force; the language used is almost always violent. 
 
Under the sovereignty framework, the States are cast as 
rivals of and challengers to the Federal Government in fields 
of policy where the States would like to claim (or reclaim) 
jurisdiction.  The States operate as outsiders who retain 
power only through vigilance, assertion, and other forms of 
active self-preservation—all of which require an adversarial 
posture and a language of violence; they engage in a never-
ending effort to police their perimeters and keep the Federal 
Government at bay. 
Ironically, conflict and violent rhetoric also play a role in 
the “cooperative” federalism framework.  When States are 
viewed as passive implementers of federal policy, they may be 
considered allies of the Federal Government, but they are still 
inferiors whose only recourse is rebellion expressed in active 
or passive resistance.  This resistance, which is often 
implemented through a violent vocabulary, becomes more 
pronounced under the more nuanced conceptions of 
cooperative federalism offered by recent scholarship, for 
example, rhetorical and uncooperative federalism.29
 
 26. See infra Part III.B.2. 
  While 
 27. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 28. See, for example, Ginsburg’s discussion of New Deal legislation and 
Supreme Court cases at the beginning of Part II.D.1.b of her opinion.  Sebelius, 
132 S. Ct. at 2622 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment 
in part, and dissenting in part). 
 29. See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 14; see also Leonard, 
supra note 16. 
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still perceiving the States as allies of the Federal 
Government, both rhetorical and uncooperative federalism 
advocate that the States must use their position to challenge 
and dissent from within the system.  Thus, even though the 
States enjoy insider status under this construction of the 
federal-state relationship, they are still limited to one of two 
courses of action: resistance or submission. 
The problem with a federalism discourse (or any 
discourse) based on the exertion of force and expressed in 
violent language is that it has nowhere to go; it is static, with 
the players cemented into their respective positions.  Just as 
war represents the ultimate termination and failure of 
diplomacy, bellicose language represents the end of 
productive dialogue.  The rhetoric is incapable of moving 
anyone to a place where mutually acceptable solutions are 
possible. 
There is, however, an alternative.  Jacques Derrida was 
one of the most prolific philosophers of the twentieth century.  
In his later works, he became increasingly concerned with 
paradoxes: specifically, the idea that the possibility and 
impossibility of a thing exist at the same time.30  One of the 
objects of his study of this possible-impossible paradox was 
the concept of hospitality.31  In Of Hospitality, Derrida 
contends that the very nature of hospitality is self-defeating 
because the host must surrender his home to the guest for the 
gesture to be complete.32  With this in mind, Derrida 
differentiates between two notions of hospitality: “absolute” 
hospitality, which he considers impossible, and “conditional” 
hospitality, which, while possible, requires rules and agreed-
upon parameters to limit the guest and his ever-gnawing 
hunger for power (for example, his desire to displace the host 
and take over the house).33
 
 30. See, e.g., JACQUES DERRIDA, GIVEN TIME: I. COUNTERFEIT MONEY 12 
(Peggy Kamuf trans., Chicago: University of Chicago Press) (1992) (suggesting 
that a genuine gift is impossible because the notion of gift-giving implicitly 
carries with it a demand for and obligation of reciprocity); JACQUES DERRIDA, 
ON COSMOPOLITANISM AND FORGIVENESS 33 (Routledge, 2001) (arguing that 
according to its own internal logic, genuine forgiving must involve the 
impossible: that is, the forgiving of an ‘unforgivable’ transgression—e.g. a 
‘mortal sin’). 
 
 31. JACQUES DERRIDA & ANNE DUFOURMANTELLE, OF HOSPITALITY 25 
(Rachel Bowlby trans., 2000) [hereinafter, DERRIDA, OF HOSPITALITY]. 
 32. Id. at 23, 25. 
 33. Id. at 25. 
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Derrida’s notion of “hospitality,” in both its absolute and 
conditional forms, provides a potent means of unpacking the 
federalism issues that shape the ACA debate and opinion.  I 
assert that federalism takes on a different color when we seek 
to understand it in terms of Derridean hospitality.  Our 
debates over federalism might actually move forward if we 
were to view the struggle between federal power and state 
sovereignty within the framework of hospitality.  The host-
guest framework would provide a new paradigm within which 
to address the dilemmas of coordinated government inherent 
in the federal-state relationship.  Shifting the discourse into a 
new paradigm creates space for innovative approaches to 
resolve those dilemmas.  Indeed, novel resolution strategies 
may be more compatible with the modern construction of the 
federal-state relationship and ultimately may result in more 
effective governance. 
This Article argues that hospitality, as conceived by 
Derrida, offers an alternative language frame through which 
to construct a new federalism discourse: one of host and guest 
rather than rival and challenger.  Derrida’s principle of 
conditional hospitality, which protects the host’s sovereignty 
by empowering him to establish boundaries and rules that 
govern his relationship with the guest, is a framework that 
stops short of violence and may initiate new and more 
effective modes of behavior.  Borrowing from this framework, 
we can begin to construct a theory of Conditional Federalism, 
a federal-state relationship that similarly stops short of 
violence and offers the states more options than simply 
rebellion on one hand or submission on the other.  By 
recognizing and protecting the sovereignty of the state, 
Conditional Federalism would protect those structural 
federalism values embraced by the sovereignty narrative, but 
it would do so without incorporating the posture of conflict 
that often takes shape within those values. 
Moreover, by stopping short of violence and recognizing 
the power of both the host and guest, Conditional Federalism 
would allow for the creation of mutually acceptable conditions 
or pacts.34
 
 34. 
  These pacts would facilitate a form of governance 
Id. at 5, 7, 21, 23, 25, 29.  Much of Derrida’s theories on hospitality are 
derived from the ancient Greek concept of the “foreigner” or xeno, as depicted in 
Plato’s The Sophist, a dialogue in which Socrates discusses how to properly deal 
with a stranger.  Derrida explores this issue in great depth in Of Hospitality, 
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that integrates the respective strengths of the state and 
federal authorities to achieve a mutually designed objective.  
Conditional Federalism can use hospitality to create and 
reinforce a federal-state relationship built on a commitment 
to governance, to the pact, which must be renewed each 
generation.35
Part II of this Article introduces the basic principles of 
Jacques Derrida’s theory of hospitality.  Part III presents the 
dominant federalism theories, including some of their more 
nuanced offshoots.  Part IV examines the Affordable Care Act 
opinion, especially the portion of it that addresses the forced 
expansion of Medicaid.  After a brief summary of the case 
outcome, this part analyzes Chief Justice Roberts’ and Justice 
Ginsburg’s opinions and demonstrates how they illustrate 
various aspects of the traditional federalism narratives.  
Finally, Part V shows how Derrida’s hospitality principles 
offer these federalism narratives a different framework 
through which to conceive a new federalism paradigm—what 
I call Conditional Federalism.  In this part, I discuss the 
common structural defect of the dominant federalism 
discourse and offer hospitality as a new way of seeing and 
speaking about the relationship between States and the 
Federal Government.  I also make an effort to show how the 
principles of hospitality allow us to read the ACA opinion 
differently, with a clearer idea of what is actually happening 
in the text.  I conclude Part V with the following argument: 
the hospitality paradigm, by displacing the theme of violence 
underlying dominant federalism narratives, has the potential 
to create a federalism discourse of shared partnership, 
allowing for transformative and more productive interaction 
  Moreover, that commitment assumes an 
aversion to violence.  The hospitality paradigm displaces rival 
and violence with partner and contractual limitation.  It 
incorporates the dominant components of the sovereignty and 
cooperative federalism narratives into a new federalism 
paradigm grounded in collaborative governance. 
 
stressing the difference between a foreigner (xeno), with whom one can establish 
a workable relationship through a pact or xenia, and a barbarian, with whom no 
pact is possible.  When extending an invitation of hospitality to a barbarian, the 
host must be prepared to grant his guest complete liberty and power within the 
house, and to allow the guest, the barbarian, to displace him as host.  That is, 
he must be prepared to become a hostage in his own home.  Id.  
 35. Id. at 21, 23. 
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and policymaking between the Federal Government and the 
States. 
I. DERRIDEAN PRINCIPLES OF DECONSTRUCTION AND 
HOSPITALITY 
The aim of this Article is to show how the text of the 
Chief Justice and Justice Ginsburg’s opinions in Sebelius can 
be deconstructed to reveal the ongoing debate between the 
two dominant federalism theories.  This deconstruction 
means to highlight the gaps between those two normative 
positions and illustrate the inability of either theory to wholly 
serve as a platform for more productive policymaking 
between the Federal Government and the States.  It is first 
necessary, however, to provide a working understanding of 
the purpose of a deconstructive technique.  In so doing, we 
can begin to appreciate the benefits that a hospitality 
paradigm may have for moving beyond the impasse that the 
dominant federalism narratives create.  Derrida spent nearly 
half a century introducing and developing his ideas about 
deconstruction.36
A. Explaining Deconstruction: A Positive Mission 
  While a full assessment of his ideas is 
beyond the scope of this paper, a brief explanation about the 
deconstructive approach is necessary to place Derrida’s 
hospitality principles in context. 
A deconstructive technique intervenes and engages with 
a text with a view towards destabilizing its assumed or 
dominant meaning.  It challenges passivity and invites one to 
pursue an active reading.  Deconstruction began as a literary 
theory which, when applied, would allow one to engage with 
the great philosophers, like Plato and Aristotle, in a new 
way.37
 
 36. See, e.g., JACQUES DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE (Alan Bass 
trans., 1978) (collecting Derrida’s essays written between 1959 and 1966 
analyzing why and how metaphysical thinking excludes writing from its 
conception of language, ultimately arguing that metaphysics itself is constituted 
by this exclusion); JACQUES DERRIDA, SPEECH AND PHENOMENA: AND OTHER 
ESSAYS ON HUSSERL’S THEORY OF SIGNS (David B. Allison & Newton Garver 
trans., 1979); and JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak trans., 2d ed. 1998). 
  The idea was to read philosophical texts in a manner 
 37. DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL: A CONVERSATION WITH JACQUES 
DERRIDA 74–76 (John D. Caputo ed. with commentary, 1997) [hereinafter 
DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL]. 
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that challenged the basis of their claim to “true” philosophy 
without destroying wholesale, their contribution to modern 
thought: to challenge the idea of the “purity” (and therefore 
unassailability) of their philosophy without annihilating the 
ideas themselves.38
Overtime, deconstruction developed within other 
academic departments and became a way to confront not only 
political thinkers, but also politics itself.
 
39  Deconstruction 
gives us a way to break free of inherited paradigms and 
interpretations that stifle transformative thought.  In fact, 
deconstruction assumes that these paradigm and 
interpretations are inherently unstable and contain within 
them the seeds of their own destruction, and that they persist 
only in a mask of strength, which, if pulled away, invites 
inevitable self-collapse.  “Deconstruction suggests that texts 
and arguments with which we are most familiar contain 
hidden and unexpected reserves, points of inner resistance, 
dialogues, and alternatives.”40
Deconstruction is suspicious of ideals, of purity, of 
anything absolute.  For Derrida, purity and origin are 
phantoms.
 
41  Thus, a desire to return to some ideal form or 
state is problematic.42  First, it is unclear whether, if ever, 
such a pure form or state ever existed.43  Second, if it is 
unclear whether a pure form or state ever existed, then we 
need to account for the difference between acceptable and 
unacceptable deviations.44
 
 38. Id. 
  That is not to say that one should 
not make deviations should  Rather, it is to suggest that 
instead of assigning blame based on an 
 39. Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”, 
11 CARDOZO L. REV. 920 (Mary Quaintance trans., 1990) (In 1989 Derrida gave 
a lecture at a conference at the Cardozo Law School, the result of which was the 
publication of The Force of Law.  In his lecture, Derrida turned to political 
philosophy and jurisprudence and associated his work with the critical legal 
studies movement.  The Force of Law signified the clear political turn of 
deconstruction engaging itself with questions of political and ethical 
responsibility toward law and justice.). 
 40. PENELOPE DEUTSCHER, HOW TO READ DERRIDA, at xii (2006). 
 41. Id. at 3. 
 42. Id. at 2. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. at 3 (“A far more complex question is which drugs and which 
toxins, which interventions and modifications we will accept, which we will 
exclude, and on what grounds.”).  
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acceptable/unacceptable (insider/outsider) construction, we 
should question the justifications for and coherence of our 
notion of purity.45
[t]he elevation of an ideal is a kind of lazy shortcut. If the 
relevant ideal is open to question . . . we must grapple 
with a responsibility we might prefer to avoid. Derrida 
believes we should ask questions that probe the phantom 
ideals implicitly at work in specific cultural, historical, 
political or literary context. What kind of responsibility 
comes with acknowledging the impossibility of those 
ideals?
  As Penelope Deutscher explains in How to 
Read Derrida: 
46
Deconstruction is a way to break down and challenge our 
concept of purity and expose the instability of inherited 
hierarchies and constructions.  The destabilization that a 
deconstructive critique produces is necessary to “provoke in 
us a new kind of ethics in which new obligations and 
decisions press on us.”
 
47
As this last sentence indicates, deconstruction is not 
nihilistic.
 
48  Indeed, by destabilizing traditional hierarchies of 
thinking, a deconstructive technique opens up space to create 
new possibilities.  That space can only be filled, however, by 
those willing to accept responsibility for new ways of 
thinking.  It is through a deconstructive critique that we may 
consent to welcome not only the present dominant voice, but 
also the voice of the other.49  Rather than nihilistic, this 
process is in fact, aspirational.50  Deconstruction lives in the 
space between what we have (but are discontent with) and 
what we want.51
 
 45. See id. 
  It enables a frame of mind that can perceive 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 7. 
 48. DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL, supra note 37, at 49 (“[There is a] 
popular image of deconstruction as some sort of intellectual ‘computer virus’ 
that destroys . . . .”). 
 49. Id. at 57 (“[D]econstruction is not . . . a destruction or demolition, but a 
way of releasing and responding, of listening and opening up, of being 
responsible not only to the dominant voices of the great masters, but also to 
other voices . . . .”).  
 50. Id. at 70 (“Deconstruction is nourished by a dream of the invention of 
the other, of something to come . . . .”). 
 51. Id. (“[D]econstruction . . . always inhabits the distance between 
something impossible . . . of which we dream and all the existing actualities and 
foreseeable possibilities, with which we are more or less discontent.”). 
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of aspiring to one state of being, while temporarily bound to 
another.52
Ultimately, deconstruction is positive and pragmatic.  It 
invites skepticism of inherited constructions to force self-
reflection in a way that opens us up to new possibilities.  The 
purpose of this self-reflection is not destruction per se; rather, 
it is to force a defense of the status quo and press change 
where that defense cannot be justified.
  This inclusive frame of mind avoids chaos.  What 
this means in the federalism context is that opening up to a 
paradigmatic shift in thinking about how to navigate the 
federal-state relationship does not necessarily require 
immediate (or ultimate) discard of the sovereignty and 
cooperative federalism paradigms. 
53  That, according to 
Derrida, is how, through the process of challenging law, one 
can pursue justice.54  Deconstruction is positive because it 
creates the conditions that enable us to aspire to a state of 
perpetual motion rather than to settle for a state of being.  
Although a state of being is attainable, it is problematic 
because it creates the false impression of purity and certainty 
and stability.  “The very meaning and mission of 
deconstruction is to show that things—texts, institutions, 
traditions, societies, beliefs, and practices . . . do not have 
definable meanings and determinable missions, that they are 
always more than any mission would impose, that they 
exceed the boundaries they currently occupy.”55
Conversely, a state of perpetual motion seeks no ideal, 
has no destination because the moment one arrives at a 
destination or obtains an “ideal” (for example, a particular 
state of being) one creates limits, conditions that prohibit 
movement beyond.  With the aspiration to a perpetual state of 
motion, there are no inhibiting static markers, only 
movement that constantly pushes against those limits to 
 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 18 (“That is what gives deconstruction its movement, that is, 
constantly to suspect, to criticize the given determinations of culture, of 
institutions, of legal systems, not in order to destroy them or simply to cancel 
them, but to be just with justice . . . .”).  
 54. Id. at 16 (“[Derrida] make[s] a distinction between the law, that is the 
history of right, of legal systems, and justice. . . .  You can improve law, you can 
replace one law by another one.  There are constitutions and institutions.  This 
is a history, and a history, as such, can be deconstructed. . . . But justice is not 
the law.  Justice is what gives us the impulse, the drive, or the movement to 
improve the law, that is, to deconstruct the law.”). 
 55. DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL, supra note 37, at 31. 
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consider a step beyond.  This push creates a state that is 
constantly transforming and therefore continually capable of 
cultivating, even celebrating difference by making space for 
possibility. 
The experience and relentless pursuit of the impossible is 
what deconstruction is all about.56  “Liberalism for [Derrida] 
is subjectivism, a philosophy in which everything turns on the 
‘rights’ of the ‘autonomous subject,’ whereas deconstruction is 
a philosophy of ‘responsibility to the other,’ where everything 
turns on the turn to the other.”57  “[I]t would not be a 
distortion to say that deconstruction is to be understood as a 
form of hospitality, that deconstruction is hospitality, which 
is the welcoming of the other.”58
As with virtually every Derridean principle, hospitality—
the essential human act of being a host—is inherently 
unstable and therefore cannot be realized in any absolute or 
ideal form.  This point will loom large when we return to the 
issue of American federalism, which, I argue, is itself founded 
on a “hospitality” or “host-and-guest” paradigm.  American 
federalism, like unconditional hospitality, is impossible to 
attain in the pure or absolute sense.  In recognizing this fact, 
however, we set ourselves free to explore the potential for a 
more attainable and effective form of federalism—Conditional 
Federalism. 
  In the discussion below, 
however, we will see that welcoming the other has its risks. 
B. Explaining Hospitality: Welcoming the Stranger 
The concept of “hospitality” is interesting because, as 
Derrida likes to point out, the word carries its own 
contradiction within it.59  The word “hospitality” means to 
welcome in the “stranger.”60  It derives from the Latin hoses, 
formed from the word hostis, originally meaning stranger.61
 
 56. Id. at 32 (citing Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical 
Foundation of Authority”, 11 CARDOZO L.REV. 920 (1990)).   
  
 57. DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL, supra note 37, at 109.  
 58. Id. at 109–10. 
 59. Jacques Derrida, Hospitality, 5 ANGELAKI: JOURNAL OF THE 
THEORETICAL HUMAN. 3, 5 (Barry Stocker & Forbes Morlock trans., 2000) 
(“Hospitality is a self-contradictory concept and experience which can only self-
destruct <put otherwise, produce itself as impossible, only be possible on the 
condition of its impossibility>. . . .”). 
 60. DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL, supra note 37, at 110.  
 61. Id. 
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The word “hospitality” developed by taking hostis, which 
evolved to mean enemy or “hostile” stranger (hostilis), and 
appending pets (potis, poets, potentia) meaning “to have 
power.”62  Given this etymology, the two main characteristics 
of the word “hospitality” are welcoming and power.63  These 
characteristics are interdependent.  The welcoming of the 
guest, the stranger, immediately interposes risk and requires 
that the host be on guard lest he lose power and mastery over 
his premises.64
The two main characteristics of hospitality create an 
inherent tension in the concept of hospitality.  This tension 
stems from the fact that hospitality requires the host to give a 
place to the stranger by welcoming him in while at the same 
time retaining control over the place in which the host has 
received the stranger.  “There is an essential ‘self-limitation’ 
built right into the idea of hospitality, which preserves the 
distance between one’s own and the stranger, between owning 
one’s own property and inviting the other into one’s home.  So 
there is always a little hostility in all hosting and hospitality  
. . . .”
 
65
The idea that the host must retain mastery and 
ownership over the property is vital to the concept of 
hospitality.  “A host is a host only if he owns the place, and 
only if he holds onto his ownership.”
 
66
When the host says to the guest, ‘Make yourself at home,’ 
this is a self-limiting invitation. ‘Make yourself at home’ 
means: please feel at home, act as if you were at home, but 
remember, that is not true, this is not your home but 
mine, and you are expected to respect my property. When 
I say ‘Welcome’ to the other, ‘Come cross my threshold,’ I 
am not surrendering my property or my identity. . . . If I 
say, ‘Welcome,’ I am not renouncing my mastery . . . .
  The way that a host 
holds onto his ownership is by limiting the welcoming.   
67
The tension between host and guest carries within it 
latent animus and the potential for violence.  And if the 
 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. See DERRIDA, OF HOSPITALITY, supra note 31, at 53–55. 
 64. Id.  
 65. DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL, supra note 37, at 110. 
 66. Id. at 110.  “[T]he host, he who offers hospitality, must be the master in 
his house, he . . . must be assured of his sovereignty over the space and goods he 
offers or opens to the other as stranger.”  Derrida, supra note 59, at 14. 
 67. DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL, supra note 37, at 111. 
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host/guest relationship were permanently locked in this 
arrangement, violence would emerge as its chief feature.  
Worse, the state of imminent or actual violence would be 
permanent, un-transcendable.  However, the characteristics 
of welcoming and power actually create two forms of 
hospitality: unconditional and conditional.  Pure, 
unconditional, for example, absolute, hospitality is what 
emerges when the host is confronted not with a foreigner or 
xeno with whom the host shares certain familial or social ties, 
but with a barbarian, the absolute other.68  Pure, 
unconditional hospitality does not require a pact or 
reciprocity of obligation, in part because only a host and guest 
who share certain social or familial customs can enter into a 
pact.69  “[U]nconditional hospitality implies that you don’t ask 
the other, the newcomer, the guest to give anything back. . . . 
[T]he condition of unconditional hospitality [is] that you give 
up the mastery of your space, your home, your nation.  It is 
unbearable.”70  When Derrida says that pure hospitality is 
“unbearable,” he means that it cannot persist for more than a 
few moments, because as soon as the barbarian guest enters 
the house, he immediately moves to displace the host, who 
has stepped aside and allowed himself to become captive.71  
At that moment, hospitality is over.72
Therefore, to sustain itself, all hospitality must be 
conditional.  The idea that absolute hospitality is impossible 
is key to Derrida’s consideration of the notion of hospitality 
within the possible-impossible paradox.
 
73  Given that absolute 
means without limitation, imagining hospitality in the 
extreme (i.e., without conditions) is unfeasible.74  “This is not 
so much an ideal; it is an impossible ideal.”75
This impossibility is not, however, negative.  “Like 
everything else in deconstruction, the possibility of 
hospitality is sustained by its impossibility . . . .”
 
76
 
 68. DERRIDA, OF HOSPITALITY, supra note 31, at 23, 25. 
  In other 
words, the pursuit of hospitality begins with the sovereign’s 
 69. Id. at 25–29. 
 70. DEUTSCHER, supra note 40, at 65. 
 71. See DERRIDA, OF HOSPITALITY, supra note 31, at 53, 55, 123, 125. 
 72. See id. 
 73. DEUTSCHER, supra note 40, at 68. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL, supra note 37, at 111. 
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welcome of the other and invitation they make themselves 
feel at home in the sovereign’s property.77  The invitation can 
only be made if the sovereign retains complete control of the 
property.78  The guest can only truly feel at home in his or her 
own home.79
Thus, for hospitality to occur, it is necessary for 
hospitality to go beyond [itself]. That requires that the 
host must, in a moment of madness, tear up the 
understanding between him and the guest, act with 
“excess,” make an absolute gift of his property, which is of 
course impossible. But that is the only way a guest can go 
away feeling as if he was really made at home.
  The necessary predicates: (1) for the host to 
have the power to invite and (2) for the guest to truly feel at 
home cannot exist simultaneously. 
80
This dilemma creates a positive dynamic because the 
only way to experience hospitality is through the pursuit of 
its impossibility, through the imperfect struggle with the 
responsibility of welcoming the other into one’s home.  The 
transformation comes when the host imposes limits on the 
guest so as to retain the host’s sovereignty, and the guest 
reciprocates by accepting some of those limits and rejecting 
others.  In this sense, the dynamic between host and guest 
becomes one of bargaining, of contracting, of building a pact. 
 
Derrida’s interest in exploring the tensions within 
“hospitality” is not aimed at cynically unmasking it as just 
more mastery and power. . . . On the contrary, he wants to 
show that hospitality is inhabited from within, inwardly 
disturbed by these tensions, but he does this precisely in 
order to open hospitality up, to keep it on guard against 
itself . . . to open—to push—it beyond itself. For it is only 
that internal tension and instability that keeps the idea of 
hospitality alive, open, loose. If it is not beyond itself, it 
falls back into itself and becomes a bit of ungracious 
meanness, that is, hostile.”81
Impossibility, therefore, is not meaningless; impossibility 
produces transformation.  Though impossible, pure, 
unconditional hospitality has a function; it gives conditional 
 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. (footnote omitted).  
 81. Id. at 112. 
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hospitality its purpose and meaning.82  “Derrida argues that 
acts of conditional hospitality take place only in the shadow of 
the impossibility of their ideal version.”83
Before temporarily leaving Derrida and his ideas on 
hospitality, I must address the violence that is inherent in the 
host-guest relationship.  At the beginning of this article, I 
stated that hospitality offered a way to transcend the current 
discourse on American federalism—a discourse I argue is 
paralyzed in the language of violence.  Given the distrust that 
emerges the moment the host invites the guest into the 
house, it seems unlikely that hospitality provides a means of 
raising any discourse out of the cemented postures of battle.  
The difference is that hospitality, while recognizing that 
violence inheres naturally in the host-guest relationship, 
further recognizes that this same violence renders the goal of 
hospitality unattainable.  It must therefore be transcended; 
swords are set aside in favor of pens and paper.  In this way, 
hospitality moves beyond its absolute and impossible form.  It 
moves toward a more pragmatic mode of being—a politics 
that is sustainable for an extended period of time.  This, I 
argue, is the lesson that must be applied to the discourse on 
American federalism. 
  This requires that 
the decision-maker push against the established limits and 
engage with the prospect of “more.”  Impossibility resists 
producing phantom ideals of purity because it pushes us to 
create and justify limits and conditions.  Each limit or 
condition creates a threshold, which sparks the imagination 
of those who contemplate the change of a step beyond it.  The 
process of negotiating with impossibility to set limits and 
then contemplating pushing beyond them opens us up to 
possibilities of transformation.  Thus, deconstruction and 
hospitality are a way to improve the law. 
II. DOMINANT FEDERALISM THEORIES 
There are two dominant federalism theories that scholars 
and courts use to explain federal-state relations.  Each one 
represents a distinct and separate vision of the concept of the 
state (as opposed to the Federal Government).  The first is a 
concept of dual federalism and can be labeled the sovereignty 
 
 82. See DEUTSCHER, supra note 40, at 68.  
 83. Id. 
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theory.84  This theory frames the federal-state relationship in 
an adversarial posture depicting the states as rivals to federal 
policymakers.85  This theory privileges the state’s role as an 
autonomous policymaker.86  The second theory is known as 
cooperative federalism.87  This theory views the states 
primarily as implementers of federal policy.88  Cooperative 
federalism frames the federal-state relationship in a united 
posture depicting the states as allies (albeit subordinate ones) 
to federal policymakers.89
A. Sovereignty Theory 
  These two theories construct dual 
largely competing narratives of the federal-state relationship.  
The first is an external narrative that posits the states as 
existing outside the Federal Government.  The second is an 
internal narrative that perceives of the states as insiders and 
passive implementers of federal policymaking. 
This theory is grounded in respect for a state’s autonomy 
to function as an independent policymaker.  Under this 
model, state autonomy serves to accomplish the values 
underlying federalism, i.e., creating laboratories of 
democracy90; diffusing power91; fostering choice92
 
 84. Gerken, supra note 12, at 1553 & n.8. 
; 
 85. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: “Converse-1983” in 
Context, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1236–37 (1994) [hereinafter Amar, Five Views 
of Federalism]; Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 
1425, 1492–93 (1987) [hereinafter Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism] 
(urging states to rival and challenge the federal government but from the 
posture of sovereign power). 
 86. Gerken, supra note 12, at 1553. 
 87. Id. at 1556. 
 88. See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 19, at 1346; Philip J. Weisner, 
Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the 
Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1695–97 (2001); Weiser, supra note 19, at 
668; see generally Joseph F. Zimmerman, National-State Relations: Cooperative 
Federalism in the Twentieth Century, 31 PUBLIUS: THE JOURNAL OF 
FEDERALISM 15, 20–22 (Spring 2001) (discussing the relationship between 
states and the Federal Government in the cooperative federal system). 
 89. See Gerken, supra note 19, at 2635 (noting that in the cooperative 
paradigm states draw their power from their insider position as federal 
servants rather than from their autonomous power as separate sovereigns). 
 90. See New State Ice. Co., v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel 
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”); 
DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE, 103 (1995); Amar, Five Views of 
Federalism, supra note 85, at 1233–36; Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of 
Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 528 (1995); McConnell, supra note 11, at 1493. 
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safeguarding individual rights93; and enhancing democratic 
participation by the citizenry.94  Under this model, the states 
interact with the Federal Government through resistance, 
and dissent.95  Because the States retain a separate and 
distinct sphere of power, they are by definition rivals of the 
Federal Government and often feel compelled to challenge 
federal power.96  This dissent is viewed as necessary to 
maintain the integrity of the federal scheme.97  This narrative 
finds support in the general idea underlying the Framers’ 
constitutional design, which held that a certain amount of 
resistance and deliberative political conflict in government 
was desirable.98  More specifically, it finds expressive force in 
those scholarly writings and judicial opinions that emphasize 
the Framer’s intent to grant only enumerated powers to the 
Federal Government, leaving all other powers to the 
individual states.99
 
 91. See, e.g., Amar, Five Views of Federalism, supra note 85, at 1236–40.  
  On the Derridean “hospitality” 
continuum, sovereignty federalism would represent that point 
where the host has invited the guest through the door and is 
now on guard against his—the guest’s—irresistible desire to 
take over every room in the house. 
 92. McConnell, supra note 11, at 1493.  
 93. See, e.g., Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, supra note 85, at 1440–
41. 
 94. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 90, at 527; Betsy J. Grey, The New 
Federalism Jurisprudence and National Tort Reform, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
475, 511 (2002); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State 
Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1988); 
Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 
58–59 (2004). 
 95.  See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 145 (2003); 
(“American founders’ largest contribution consisted in their design of a system 
that would ensure a place for diverse views in government.”). 
 96. See generally Gerken, supra note 12; Amar, Of Sovereignty and 
Federalism, supra note 85. 
 97. Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1749 
(2005) (“[D]issent . . . contributes to the marketplace of ideas, engages electoral 
minorities . . . , and facilitates self-expression.”) (emphasis omitted); Merritt, 
supra note 94, at 5–6 (asserting that states may act as lobbyists and litigants to 
challenge federal policies and programs). 
 98. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 426–27 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[D]ifferences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties . . . often 
promote deliberation and circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the 
majority.”). 
 99. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution . . . , are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”). 
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B. Cooperative Federalism Theory 
Opposing the sovereignty federalism theory is 
cooperative federalism.100  This theory recognizes the 
practical necessity of embracing a federal-state relationship 
that acknowledges that federal policymaking power in the 
modern age is broad in scope and now penetrates deeply into 
local fields of governance.101  This theory shifts emphasis from 
autonomy to integration.102  Under this model, the states 
interact with the Federal Government as supportive allies 
and faithful agents implementing federal policy.103  Although 
allies, the states do occasionally chafe under the yoke of 
federal power and make attempts at rebellion.104
Like sovereignty federalism, cooperative federalism has 
an analog on the continuum of Derridean hospitality.  It 
exists at a point well past the initial moment of contact 
  To the 
extent that these efforts are successful, they tend to change 
only the content of the directive from the Federal 
Government, not the power structure, which makes that 
directive possible. 
 
 100. For scholarship discussing cooperative federalism, see, for example, 
DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 162 (2d 
ed. 1972); MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW OF 
GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1966); John Kincaid, 
The Competitive Challenge to Cooperative Federalism: A Theory of Federal 
Democracy, in COMPETITION AMONG STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: 
EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 87 (Daphne A. Kenyon & 
John Kincaid eds., 1991); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 19; Weiser, supra note 19; 
Zimmerman, supra note 87.  For a historical perspective, see, for example, 
Harry N. Scheiber, American Federalism and the Diffusion of Power: Historical 
and Contemporary Perspectives, 9 U. TOL. L. REV. 619 (1978). 
 101. Weiser, supra note 19, at 665 (arguing that because so many federal 
regulatory programs are heavily dependent on state implementation, it is a 
mistake to “view[] each jurisdiction as a separate entity that regulates in its 
own distinct sphere of authority”). 
 102. Gerken, supra note 18, at 7 (discussing cooperative federalism 
scholarship’s location of state power in integration and interdependence with 
the federal government rather than autonomy and independence from it). 
 103. See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, 
and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1550) (2007) (noting 
that while cooperative federalism programs “typically involve a federal statute 
that regulates a risk or addresses a social ill or need” but “do not depend solely 
on federal actors for their implementation and enforcement”); Rose-Ackerman, 
supra note 19, at 1346 (illustrating how Medicaid exemplifies the states’ role in  
implementing a federal program). 
 104. Gerken, supra note 18, at 35–40 (arguing that the states possess a 
vertical checks and balances power on the federal government by virtue of their 
servile position within the cooperative federalism model).  
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between the host and guest, beyond even that moment when 
they move around each other uneasily, testing each other’s 
resolve.  Instead, cooperative federalism assumes that the 
guest has already taken over the house, displaced the host, 
and made him a servant.  The original host, now held in an 
inferior position, can assert himself only through subterfuge, 
which is risky and, even if successful, will never return him to 
“head of the house.” 
III. THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT OPINION 
NFIB v. Sebelius operates as a point of intersection 
between the legal discourse of federalism and the 
philosophical discourse of hospitality.  As a bridge between 
the two, the Affordable Care Act case provides points of 
illustration of both the problems inherent in the dominant 
federalism narratives as well as the opportunities for 
engaging in a new way of speaking about the federal-state 
relationship.  After summarizing the main legal points of 
Sebelius, this section focuses on key language from both Chief 
Justice Roberts’ opinion and Justice Ginsburg’s opinion.  This 
textual focus illustrates the dominant federalism narrative to 
which each relied as the normative underpinning to their 
analysis, for example, sovereignty and cooperative federalism 
respectively. 
A. ACA Case Summary 
In March 2010, President Obama signed the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) into law.105  
Lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the 
comprehensive healthcare reform measure immediately 
followed.106  In March of 2012, the Supreme Court in 
consolidated cases National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius107
 
 105. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010). 
 heard six hours of oral argument over 
three days concerning the constitutionality of four aspects of 
 106. See Liberty Univ. Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2011); Virginia 
ex rel. Cuccinelle v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011); Thomas Moore Law 
Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011); Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1 
(D.C. Cir. 2011); Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., 
648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 107. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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the ACA: (1) whether Congress has the power to enact an 
individual mandate that requires nearly all Americans to 
purchase health insurance or pay a fine;108 (2) whether the 
Act’s expansion of Medicaid eligibility amounts to 
unconstitutional federal coercion of the states; (3) whether, if 
found unconstitutional, the individual mandate is severable, 
allowing the rest of the health care law to stand; and finally; 
(4) assuming the individual purchase mandate constitutes a 
tax, whether the Anti-Injunction Act109
On June 28, 2012, the Court issued its 5-4 decision 
upholding the ACA, the central legislative achievement of the 
Obama Administration, with Chief Justice Roberts siding 
with four of the Court’s more liberal members.
 prohibits the Court 
from hearing the issue before the tax laws take effect. 
110  The Court 
also held that the Anti-Injunction Act was not applicable to 
the ACA’s individual mandate provision and therefore, did 
not prevent the Court from exercising jurisdiction.111
Chief Justice Roberts joined by Justices Breyer, 
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan upheld the individual 
mandate as a constitutional exercise of Congress’s power to 
tax.
 
112  Despite the fact that the ACA labeled the fine 
triggered by failure to purchase health insurance a 
“penalty,”113
 
 108. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2013) (requiring non-exempt individuals to maintain 
“minimum essential” health insurance coverage or pay a fine). 
 the Chief Justice explained that labels were not 
 109. Id. § 7421(a) (providing that “no suit for the purpose of restraining the 
assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any 
person.”  In other words, those subject to a tax must first pay it and then sue for 
a refund).  The Supreme Court itself stated that “taxes are the life-blood of 
government, and their prompt and certain availability an imperious need.”  Bull 
v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935). 
 110. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus, 132 S. Ct. at 2608. 
 111. Id. at 2584.  The AIA was arguably relevant to the ACA because the 
individual mandate does not go into effect until 2014 and therefore no citizen 
would be required to pay a penalty for failure to purchase insurance until 2015.  
Id. at 2580.  The ACA litigation sought to prevent collection of the fine from 
those individuals who decided not to purchase health insurance according to the 
terms of the individual mandate provision.  Id. at 2582.  The Court held that the 
Congress did not intend for the payment to be treated as a tax for purposes of 
the AIA, and while the label did not control for purposes of determining 
constitutionality, it was dispositive in terms of determining whether the AIA 
applied.  Id. at 2584. 
 112. See id. at 2598; see generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“Congress 
shall have the Power to Lay and collect Taxes.”). 
 113. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2594. 
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dispositive.114  Instead, he referenced a well-settled 
prudential rule of constitutional adjudication requiring that 
“if a statute has two possible meanings, one of which violates 
the Constitution, courts should adopt the meaning that does 
not do so.”115  Because “every reasonable construction must be 
resorted to, in order to save a statute from 
unconstitutionality,”116 the Chief Justice continued, the 
question was not whether the payment was a tax under the 
most natural reading of the Act, but whether it was a “fairly 
possible”117 one.118  A majority of the Court held that it was.119
Although failing to produce a single opinion, the Chief 
Justice joined the dissenters in concluding
 
120 that the 
individual mandate was not a proper use of Congress’ power 
under the Commerce Clause121 and the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.122
The individual mandate, however, does not regulate 
existing commercial activity. It instead compels 
individuals to become active in commerce by purchasing a 
product, on the ground that their failure to do so affects 
interstate commerce. Construing the Commerce Clause to 
permit Congress to regulate individuals precisely because 
they are doing nothing would open a new and potentially 
  The Chief’s opinion approvingly cited to the 
activity/inactivity distinction, which had permeated the 
health care debate: 
 
 114. See id. at 2594–95. 
 115. Id. at 2593 (“No court ought, unless the terms of an act rendered it 
unavoidable, to give a construction to it which should involve a violation, 
however unintentional, of the constitution.” (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 
433, 448–49 (1830)).  Moreover, “the rule is settled that as between two possible 
interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by 
the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save the Act.” Id. 
(quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring)). 
 116. Id. at 2594 (quoting, Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)). 
 117. Id. (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 2598 (“Our precedent demonstrates that Congress had the power 
to impose the exaction in [section] 5000A under the taxing power, and that 
[section] 5000A need not be read to do more than impose a tax.  That is enough 
to sustain it.”). 
 120. See id. at 2593. 
 121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power to “regulate 
Commerce . . . among the several States”). 
 122. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (giving Congress the power to “make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” the 
powers enumerated in the Constitution). 
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vast domain to congressional authority.123
Stating that the Commerce Clause was not a “general 
license [permitting Congress] to regulate an individual from 
cradle to grave,” the Chief Justice concluded that the 
mandate exceeded the scope of Congress’s power to regulate 
commerce.
 
124
As to the Government’s Necessary and Proper Clause 
argument, the Chief’s opinion declared that precedent 
confined the scope of the clause to sanction only those laws 
that “involved exercises of [Congress’s] authority derivative 
of, and in service to, a granted power.”
 
125  Here, the Chief 
stated, “[t]he individual mandate . . . vests Congress with the 
extraordinary ability to create the necessary predicate to the 
exercise of an enumerated power.”126  Thus, the Chief 
concluded, even if the individual mandate was “necessary” to 
the ACA’s insurance reforms, it was not a “proper” means of 
enacting them.127
A majority of the justices also agreed that another 
challenged provision of the Act, a significant expansion of 
Medicaid, was not a valid exercise of Congress’ spending 
power, as it would coerce states to either accept the expansion 
or risk losing existing Medicaid funding.
 
128  The Spending 
Clause authorizes Congress to “pay the Debts and provide for 
the common Defense and general Welfare of the United 
States.”129  Although the spending power permits Congress to 
incentivize state participation in federal programs by 
conditioning receipt of federal funding on compliance, the 
conditions must permit a State to voluntarily and knowingly 
accept the terms of any such program.130  The spending 
power, the Chief stated, does not permit “the Federal 
Government [to] compel the States to enact or administer a 
federal regulatory program.”131
 
 123. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2587. 
 
 124. See id. at 2591. 
 125. Id. at 2592. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See id. at 2605, 2666 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito JJ., dissenting). 
 129. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 130. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct at 2574 (citing Pennhurst State 
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). 
 131. Id. at 2601 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 
(1992)). 
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The ACA included an expansion provision that directed 
states to adjust their Medicaid eligibility rules to cover all 
people with income less than 133% of the federal poverty 
line.132  The ACA authorizes the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services to revoke Medicaid funding from those states 
that decline to expand coverage.133  As written, the Act 
permits the Secretary to revoke both funds for the expansion 
as well as funding for existing state Medicaid programs.134  In 
his opinion, the Chief Justice differentiated the existing 
Medicaid program from the Medicaid expansion, observing 
that the “original program was designed to cover medical 
services for four particular categories of the needy: the 
disabled, the blind, the elderly, and needy families with 
dependent children,”135 whereas the expansion changed 
Medicaid “into a program to meet the healthcare needs of the 
entire nonelderly population with income below 133 percent 
of the poverty level”.136  This “shift in kind,” the Chief stated, 
means that “[Medicaid] is no longer a program to care for the 
neediest among us, but rather an element of a comprehensive 
national plan to provide universal health insurance 
coverage.”137  The Chief concluded, “A State could hardly 
anticipate that Congress’s reservation of the right to “alter” or 
“amend” the Medicaid program included the power to 
transform it so dramatically.”138  The Chief Justice found that 
the withholding—not the granting—of federal funds was 
incompatible with the Spending Clause.139  Thus, in a narrow 
decision, the Court upheld the Medicaid expansion as 
available to any State that willingly chose to participate, but 
precluded the Secretary from applying section 1396c to 
withdraw existing Medicaid funds from states that decided 
not to participate.140
The Court did not reach the severability issue as it 
related to the individual mandate because it found that the 
mandate was a constitutional exercise of Congress’s taxing 
 
 
 132. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2013). 
 133. Id. § 1396c. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus, 132 S. Ct at 2605–06. 
 136. Id. at 2606. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See id. at 2607. 
 140. See id. at 2608. 
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power.141  The Court did, however, discuss severability as it 
related to the Medicaid expansion.142  Although Justices 
Ginsburg and Sotomayor were of the view that the Spending 
Clause did not prevent the Secretary from withdrawing 
existing Medicaid funds from any state that declined to 
participate in the Medicaid expansion, they nevertheless 
agreed with the Chief Justice’s conclusion that the Medicaid 
Act’s severability clause143 determined the appropriate 
remedy “[i]f any provision of [the Medicaid Act], or the 
application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held 
invalid, the remainder of the chapter, and the application of 
such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be 
affected thereby.”144
Concluding that Congress would have wanted the rest of 
the ACA to stand had it known that the States would have a 
genuine choice as to whether to participate in the Medicaid 
expansion, the other provisions of the ACA were not 
affected.
 
145
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissented, 
arguing that the individual mandate was unconstitutional 
because it exceeded the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause 
power.
 
146  They also argued that the constitutionality of the 
mandate could not be sustained by reclassifying it as a tax 
rather than a penalty.147  The Justices contended that to 
reclassify the penalty as a tax was not interpreting the 
statute, but rewriting it.148  Finally, the dissenters argued 
that because both the individual mandate and the withdrawal 
of existing Medicaid funds from those states that declined to 
participate in the Medicaid expansion exceeded Congress’s 
constitutional authority, the ACA should be deemed 
inoperable and struck down in its entirety.149
 
 141. See id. at 2598. 
 
 142. See id. at 2607–08. 
 143. 42 U.S.C. § 1303 (2013).  
 144. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2607 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in 
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
 145. Id. at 2607–08. 
 146. See id. at 2644 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito JJ., dissenting). 
 147. See id. at 2650–56. 
 148. Id. at 2655. 
 149. Id. at 2643. 
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B. ACA Opinion Illustration of Dominant Federalism Theories 
The ACA litigation raises two separate federalism claims.  
The first was whether the statute’s individual mandate 
exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause power by “completely 
obliterating the Constitution’s distinction between national 
and local authority.”150  The second was whether the Medicaid 
expansion violated the tenth Amendment by compelling the 
states to accept it.151
1. Chief Justice Roberts and the Sovereignty Theory of 
Federalism 
  Although the two claims challenged 
different sources of Congress’s power (the individual mandate 
was grounded in the Commerce Clause power or alternatively 
Congress’s taxing power, whereas the Medicaid expansion 
was grounded in Congress’s exercise of its Spending Clause 
power), the underlying question driving the opinions’ 
rationale in Sebelius was the same: do the principles of 
federalism allow Congress to exercise federal power in this 
way?  While conducting separate doctrinal analyses to 
determine whether Congress had exceeded the scope of any 
one power (commerce, taxing, spending) the question about 
the proper conception of federalism drove each of those 
analyses.  Even though the opinions’ analytical outcomes 
differed, as did their reliance on separate theories of 
federalism to support those outcomes, the opinions’ were 
nevertheless framed in the same discourse: violence. 
Chief Justice Roberts began his opinion by reiterating 
traditional values of federalism: restraining power,152
 
 150. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000). 
 
 151. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct at 2601–09. 
 152. Id. at 2577–78. 
[T]he Constitution did not initially include a Bill of Rights at least 
partly because the Framers felt the enumeration of powers 
sufficed to restrain the Government. As Alexander Hamilton put 
it, ‘the Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every 
useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS.’. And when the Bill of Rights 
was ratified, it made express what the enumeration of powers 
necessarily implied: ‘The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution . . . are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.’ The Federal Government has 
expanded dramatically over the past two centuries, but it still 
must show that a constitutional grant of power authorizes each of 
its actions. See, e.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 
(2010). 
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enhancing democratic rule by providing government that is 
closer to the people,153 and decreasing the likelihood of federal 
tyranny.154
Roberts’ analysis of the individual mandate begins with 
the first order inquiry: at what point does inertia become 
activity?  As indicated in the preceding section, the Chief’s 
opinion held that although the individual mandate was 
unconstitutional as an exercise of Congress’s Commerce 
Clause power, it was a constitutional exercise of Congress’s 
taxing power.
  This reiteration signals the dominant federalism 
theory Roberts uses to support his doctrinal outcomes: 
sovereignty.  While the majority of this paper focuses on how 
Roberts’ and Ginsburg’s opinions address the Medicaid 
expansion, analysis of the Chief Justice’s treatment of the 
individual mandate is in order because it operates within the 
same violence framework that dominates his Spending 
Clause analysis.  As to both doctrinal analyses—whether the 
individual mandate exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause 
power and whether the Medicaid expansion compels states 
under Congress’s Spending Power—the Chief Justice’s 
opinion is framed in the discourse of conflict, of turf wars, of 
violence.  This discourse of conflict represents an approach 
consistent with Derrida’s notion of absolute hospitality—it 
describes the point where the guest has pushed the host to 
near-surrender. 
155
 
Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton); U.S. CONST. amend. 
X; and citing U.S. v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010)).  See also New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (“State sovereignty is not just an end in 
itself:  ‘[r]ather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the 
diffusion of sovereign power.’ ” )  (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 
759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). 
  Rather than rely on the customary allocation 
 153. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2578 (“Because the police 
power is controlled by 50 different States instead of one national sovereign, the 
facets of governing that touch on citizens’ daily lives are normally administered 
by smaller governments closer to the governed.  The Framers thus ensured that 
powers which ‘in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and 
properties of the people’ were held by governments more local and more 
accountable than a distant federal bureaucracy.” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 
45 (James Madison))). 
 154. Id. (“The independent power of the States also serves as a check on the 
power of the Federal Government: ‘By denying any one government complete 
jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, federalism protects the liberty of 
the individual from arbitrary power.’ ”  (quoting Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct 
2355, 2364 (2011))). 
 155. Id. at 2598. 
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of subject matter authority between the federal government 
and the states, which, for example, identifies criminal law, 
family law, and education, as traditional subjects of state 
regulation,156
The individual mandate, however, does not regulate 
existing commercial activity. It instead compels 
individuals to become active in commerce by purchasing a 
product, on the ground that their failure to do so affects 
interstate commerce. Construing the Commerce Clause to 
permit Congress to regulate individuals precisely because 
they are doing nothing would open a new and potentially 
vast domain to congressional authority.
 Roberts instead focused on the nature of the 
regulated conduct defined in terms of activity and inactivity: 
157
To an economist, perhaps, there is no difference between 
activity and inactivity; both have measurable economic 
effects on commerce. But the distinction between doing 
something and doing nothing would not have been lost on 
the Framers[.]
 
158
The Framers gave Congress the power to regulate 
commerce, not compel it, and for over 200 years both our 
decisions and Congress’s actions have reflected this 
understanding. There is no reason to depart from that 
understanding now.
 
159
The Commerce Clause is not a general license to regulate 
an individual from cradle to grave, simply because he will 
predictably engage in particular transactions. Any police 
power to regulate individuals as such, as opposed to their 
activities, remains vested in the States.
 
160
Although each of these passages expresses and/or 
reinforces the same idea—that Congress’s commerce power is 
limited to actual commercial activity and does not extend to a 
person’s decision not to enter a particular market—I want to 
 
 
 156. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615–16 (2000) (“Petitioners’ 
reasoning, moreover, will not limit Congress to regulating violence but may, as 
we suggested in Lopez, be applied equally well to family law and other areas of 
traditional state regulation since the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and 
child rearing on the national economy is undoubtedly significant.”); see also id. 
at 618 (“The regulation and punishment intrastate violence that is not directed 
at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has 
always been the province of the States.”). 
 157. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2587. 
 158. Id. at 2589. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 2591. 
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focus on Roberts’ statement that “[t]he Framers gave 
Congress the power to regulate commerce, not compel it  
. . . .”161  The sentence fits the Derridean hospitality formula 
almost perfectly.  It poses the Framers (representing the 
People through the States) as the original hosts and Congress 
as the guest invited in to assist with the running of the house 
(the new nation, the United States).  In this invitation, the 
host gives the guest certain powers, among them the power to 
regulate commerce among the several states, whose 
sovereignty exists a priori.  But something has happened 
along the way: the xeno—the foreigner/guest, Congress—has 
moved to increase his power beyond the original grant and is 
no longer content to regulate commerce but now wishes to 
compel commerce, which conveniently would give the guest 
the ability to bring virtually every human decision within its 
original grant of power.  If the host—the Framers, the 
states—were to accept this graft upon the guest’s initial 
power to regulate commerce, all sovereignty would be lost, 
thus manifesting Derrida’s notion of the impossibility of 
hospitality.162
Roberts’ word choice is also telling and reflects 
mimetically the violence that has now invested the host-guest 
relationship.  “Regulate,” while hardly passive, is a word that 
signals oversight of activities already in progress, activities 
freely chosen by the participants.  The regulator’s power is 
undeniable but latent and limited, exercised only to ensure a 
smooth flow of trade.  “Compel” is different.  To compel is to 
force someone to do something he or she otherwise refuses to 
do.  It involves pressure, overwhelming and irresistible 
pressure.  It is not surprising, then, that Chief Justice 
Roberts and the four other “sovereignty” federalists on the 
Court could not abide Congress’s wish to drive each American 
adult into the health insurance market, where he or she will 
 
 
 161. Id. at 2589. 
 162. DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL, supra note 37, at 111 (noting, “for 
hospitality to occur, it is necessary for hospitality to beyond hospitality.  That 
requires that the host must, in a moment of madness, tear up the 
understanding between him and the guest, act with ‘excess,’ make an absolute 
gift of his property, which is of course impossible.”).  Beginning with his famous 
1963 lecture on Foucault, Derrida repeatedly invoked the “moment of madness” 
line from Kierkegaard, often translated from his French as “the instant of 
decision is madness” (L’Instant de la De’cision est une Folie). DERRIDA, WRITING 
AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 36, at 31. 
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be regulated by the Federal Government until death. 
Roberts’ decision to uphold the individual mandate 
provision under Congress’s taxing power can be reconciled 
with the Court’s decision not to apply the Anti-Injunction Act 
given the different parameters of a statutory (for example, 
the application of the Anti-Injunction Act to the “shared 
responsibility payment”) versus constitutional (for example, 
the scope of Congress’s taxing power authority) 
interpretation.  What is interesting, however, is the way 
Roberts’ position coincides with the ideas inherent in 
sovereignty federalism, in that it reinforces the hierarchical 
relationship between the states and the federal government.  
Perhaps in recognition of Congress’s ability to enact a “single-
payer” national health insurance system, in which the states 
would play no decision-making role at all, Roberts found a 
way to preserve the individual mandate while exposing it as a 
top-down use of federal power, i.e., a federal tax imposed on 
the citizens.  Not only does this lock the federal and state 
governments in a clash over policy, it foments dissent among 
individuals because it characterizes Congress’s action as a 
“tax,” which is arguably among the most contemptible words 
in American political parlance.  To put this in Derridean 
“hospitality” terms, the host, seeing he cannot resist by direct 
means the guest’s intrusion into yet another domain 
previously outside the guest’s reach, attempts to poison it by 
calling it the one thing most likely to generate political 
opposition—in this case, a tax.163
Although implicit in the Chief Justice’s analysis of the 
individual mandate, the discourse of violence becomes explicit 
when the Chief’s opinion turns to the Medicaid expansion and 
Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause.  Roberts 
began by framing the issue as a threat.  “[The States] claim 
that Congress is coercing the States to adopt the changes it 
wants by threatening to withhold all of a State’s Medicaid 
  Through this process, with 
all of its language queues, Roberts continues to operate 
within a system that perpetuates the master/slave 
relationship: a relationship that reinforces government power 
through violence rather than cooperation. 
 
 163. In this analogy, Chief Justice Roberts give voice to the host-states.  In a 
sense, the states are “speaking” the only way a state can speak in a judicial 
opinion, through a member of the Court. 
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grants, unless the State accepts the new expanded funding 
and complies with the conditions that come with it.”164
What is interesting is that initially Roberts 
acknowledged that the Court’s jurisprudence provided a 
nonviolent framework through which to discuss productive 
federal-state relations in terms of policymaking and 
implementation.  In fact, what he described rather resembles 
Derrida’s concept of the “hospitality” pact.  Roberts wrote, 
“[w]e have repeatedly characterized . . . Spending Clause 
legislation as ‘much in the nature of a contract.’”
 
165
So who is it that the states are defending themselves 
against?  This may seem like a simple question to answer 
given that the Medicaid expansion is a part of the federally 
enacted ACA.  The obvious answer, the federal government, 
however, misses the point of the question.  The question more 
precisely is this: how does Roberts describe whom it is that 
the states are defending themselves against?  How does he 
characterize the federal government in this situation?  It 
would be fair to say that the Chief’s opinion tells the story of 
the States defending themselves against an attack by an 
armed “thug”
  But 
almost immediately after this preliminary statement, the 
Chief disregarded non-violent discourse and expressly 
reverted back to a bellicose language plan: an attack has been 
launched, a threat has been issued, battle lines have been 
drawn, and the States must defend. 
166—a bully.  Roberts referred to the Medicaid 
expansion as a “weapon[] of coercion, destroying or impairing 
the autonomy of the States,”167 and then described the 
financial inducement it offers to the States as “a gun to the 
head”168 wielded under the threat of “[y]our money or your 
life.”169
 
 164. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2601. 
  This is not the language one uses to frame a judicial 
decision about the proper federal-state policy-
making/implementing relationship; this is the language one 
uses in a police report to describe a “stick-up.”  In this way, 
what Roberts described corresponds to that moment in 
 165. Id. at 2602 (quoting Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002)). 
 166. Id. at 2605 (“The threatened loss of over [ten] percent of a State’s overall 
budget is economic dragooning . . . .”). 
 167. Id. at 2603 (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 586 
(1937)). 
 168. Id. at 2604. 
 169. Id. at 2605 n.12.  
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Derridean hospitality, when the violent, usurping behavior of 
the guest actually displaces the host.170  “Anyone who 
encroaches on my ‘at home,’ on my ipseity, on my power of 
hospitality, on my sovereignty as host, I start to regard as an 
undesirable foreigner, and virtually as an enemy.  This other 
becomes a hostile subject, and I risk becoming their 
hostage.”171
It is the possibility of the states becoming hostage to the 
federal Medicaid program that is driving Roberts to use 
phrases like “gun to the head” and “your money or your life.”  
He is responding to a federal posture that is, in his opinion, 
coercive in the extreme.  What is especially galling to Roberts 
is that the federal government has for decades allowed the 
states to incorporate Medicaid deeply into their own health 
services and fiscal programs, effectively making the states 
dependent on Federal Medicaid funding.
 
172  With that 
dependency in place, Congress is now demanding that the 
states expand their Medicaid services or lose all funding, a 
consequence so devastating that it makes dissent near-
impossible.173  “The threatened loss of over [ten] percent of a 
State’s overall budget . . . is economic dragooning that leaves 
the States with no real option but to acquiesce in the 
Medicaid expansion.”174
The Chief’s opinion exemplifies two main features of the 
sovereignty theory of federalism.  The first is that it 
privileges state autonomy as a dominant federalism value.
  For Roberts, such strong-arm tactics 
must be resisted. 
175
 
 170. Derrida tracks this inversion of the power relationship etymologically, 
as the “host” becomes the object of “hostility” and is ultimately transformed into 
a “hostage.”  See DERRIDA, ON HOSPITALITY, supra note 31, at 53, 55. 
  
Second, it construes the general nature of the federal-state 
 171. Id. 
 172. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2605. 
 173. See id. 
 174. Id.  The verb “dragoon” was coined in the aftermath of the English Civil 
War and means “to subjugate or persecute by harsh use of troops” or “to force or 
attempt to force into submission by violent measures.”  MERRIAM-WEBSTERS 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 351 (10th ed. 1995). 
 175. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2592 (“[W]e have . . . 
carried out our responsibility to declare unconstitutional those laws that 
undermine the structure of government established by the Constitution.  Such 
laws . . . are, ‘in the words of The Federalist, merely acts of usurpation which 
deserve to be treated as such.’ ”  (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 
924 (1997)). 
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relationship as one grounded in competition where the states 
are rivals and challengers to federal policymaking and vice-
versa.  “In the typical case, we look to the States to defend 
their prerogatives by adopting ‘the simple expedient of not 
yielding’ to federal blandishments when they do not want to 
embrace the federal policies as their own.  The States are 
separate and independent sovereigns.”176  Moreover, 
“Congress may not simply ‘conscript state [agencies] into the 
national bureaucratic army.’” 177
Although the distinct spheres of federal versus state 
sovereignty are not couched in terms of traditional subjects of 
integral or exclusive state regulation (a framework which has 
proved unworkable given its indeterminacy),
 
178 the Chief’s 
opinion defends that wall separating “what is truly national 
and what is truly local.”179
2. Justice Ginsburg and the Cooperative Theory of 
Federalism 
 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion, on the other hand, champions 
the principles of cooperative federalism.180  Underscoring her 
analysis—both on the individual mandate and the Medicaid 
expansion—is a conviction that the Framers of the 
Constitution intended article I, section 8 to empower 
Congress to address problems of collective action involving 
multiple states.181
 
 176. Id. at 2603 (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923)). 
  Following the American Revolution, the 
 177. Id. at 2606–07 (quoting FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775 (1982) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)). 
 178. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 179. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000) (quoting United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995)). 
 180. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2609–42 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
 181. Id. at 2615 (“The Commerce Clause, it is widely acknowledged, ‘was the 
Framers’ response to the central problem that gave rise to the Constitution 
itself.’ ”  (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 245 n.1 (1983) (Stevens, J., 
concurring))).  Under the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution’s precursor, 
the regulation of commerce was left to the States.  This scheme proved 
unworkable, because the individual States, understandably focused on their 
own economic interests, often failed to take actions critical to the success of the 
Nation as a whole.  See James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the 
United States No. 5, in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 69, 71 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 
1999) (arguing that as a result of the “want of concert in matters where common 
interest requires it,” the “national dignity, interest, and revenue [have] 
suffered.”). 
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states acted individually, discriminating against commerce 
coming from other states, when they needed to act 
collectively.182  The Articles of Confederation left Congress 
powerless to solve these problems.183  Thus emerged the 
Constitution, establishing a federal government equipped to 
address these collective action problems under its authority to 
tax, borrow money, raise and support a military, and regulate 
interstate commerce.184  Against this background justification 
for congressional authority, Justice Ginsburg analyzes the 
scope of federal power as exercised in the ACA.185
After reading through the Chief Justice’s opinion with its 
recurrent use of battle language, where war and violence are 
explicit, one might be under the impression that Justice 
Ginsburg’s use of phrases like “retain[ing] a robust role for  
. . . state governments,”
 
186 “empower[ing the] states,”187 
“offer[ing] States an opportunity,”188 and “gave the States the 
opportunity to partner”189
 
 182. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2615 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) 
(“Alexander Hamilton described the problem this way:  ‘[Often] it would be 
beneficial to all the states to encourage, or suppress[,] a particular branch of 
trade, while it would be detrimental . . . to attempt it without the concurrence of 
the rest.’ ”  (quoting Alexander Hamilton, The Continentalist No. V, in 3 THE 
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 75, 78 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962))). 
 render her opinion devoid of violent 
themes.  This, however, is not the case. 
 183. See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN 
THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 24–28, 47–48, 102–08, 167–68, 188–89 
(1996) (discussing various failures of the Articles of Confederation). 
 184. See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Apr. 8, 
1787), in 9 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 368, 370 (Robert A. Rutland & William 
M. E. Rachal eds., 1975) (expressing the need for a “national Government . . . 
armed with a positive [and] complete authority in all cases where uniform 
measures are necessary.”); see also Letter from George Washington to James 
Madison (Nov. 30, 1785), in 8 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 428, 429 (Robert A. 
Rutland & William M. E. Rachal eds., 1973) (“We are either a United people, or 
we are not.  If the former, let us, in all matters of general concern act as a 
nation, which ha[s] national objects to promote, and a national character to 
support.”); see also Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seeling, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935) 
(stating that the Constitution “was framed upon the theory that the peoples of 
the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run 
prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.”).  
 185. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2612 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in 
part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (“States cannot 
resolve the problem of the uninsured on their own.”). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 2632. 
 188. Id. at 2629. 
 189. Id. at 2633. 
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Although Justice Ginsburg’s opinion is couched in less 
obviously violent language, the principle theme of violence 
persists in the structure of her argument.  Her rationale 
proceeds from the underlying premise that the states are 
incompetent to respond in any meaningful way to the health 
care issues the ACA addresses, and that this incompetence 
renders the states displaceable: 
States cannot resolve the problem of the uninsured on 
their own.190
The Framers’ solution was the Commerce Clause, which, 
as they perceived it, granted Congress the authority to 
enact economic legislation “in all Cases for the general 
Interests of the Union, and also in those Cases to which 
the States are separately incompetent.”
 
191
States that undertake health-care reforms on their own 
thus risk “placing themselves in a position of economic 
disadvantage as compared with neighbors or competitors  
. . . .”
 
192  Congress’ intervention was needed to overcome 
this collective-action impasse.193
Far from trampling on States’ sovereignty, the ACA 
attempts a federal solution for the very reason that the 
States, acting separately cannot, meet the need.
 
194
[T]he minimum coverage provision, along with other 
provisions of the ACA, addresses the very sort of 
interstate problems that made the commerce power 
essential in our federal system. The crisis created by the 
large number of U.S. residents who lack health insurance 
is one of national dimension that States are “separately 
incompetent” to handle.
 
195
Based on this major premise of incompetency, Ginsburg’s 
argument asserts the consequent minor premise that the 
Court must privilege pragmatics over abstract generalities 
when assessing the scope of Congress’s power, particularly 
regarding Commerce Clause power.
 
196
 
 190. Id. at 2612. 
  In other words, 
 191. Id. at 2615 (quoting 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 
¶8, at 131–32 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)). 
 192. Id. at 2612 (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644 (1937)). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 2628. 
 195. Id. (citation omitted). 
 196. Id. at 2616 (“Consistent with the Framers’ intent, we have repeatedly 
emphasized that Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause is dependent 
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practical considerations should trump arbitrary theoretical 
restrictions: “We afford Congress the leeway ‘to undertake to 
solve national problems directly and realistically.’” 197
With competence clearly establishing the authority for 
and scope of federal power, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion goes on 
to illustrate the federal-state relationship according to the 
principles of cooperative federalism.  It is a testament to how 
engrained these federalism narratives are in our judicial and 
political psyche, however, to note that even though Ginsburg’s 
argument is grounded in the cooperative federalism 
narrative, she still finds it necessary to engage, albeit briefly, 
with the sovereignty narrative.
 
198
It is precisely because Ginsburg’s opinion establishes 
from the outset the federal-state hierarchy, as well as state 
subservience within that hierarchy, that one cannot easily see 
the violence discourse underlying her analysis of the 
Medicaid expansion.  It is hidden in the subtlety of a 
language-frame of state empowerment.  Her opinion even 
goes so far as to describe Medicaid as the classic example of 
federal-state cooperation: 
 
Medicaid is a prototypical example of federal-state 
cooperation in serving the Nation’s general welfare. 
Rather than authorizing a federal agency to administer a 
uniform national health-care system for the poor, 
Congress offered States the opportunity to tailor Medicaid 
grants to their particular needs . . . .199
[A]ny fair appraisal of Medicaid would require 
acknowledgment of the considerable autonomy States 
enjoy under the Act.
 
200
Subject to its basic requirements, the Medicaid Act 
empowers the States to “select dramatically different 
levels of funding and coverage, alter and experiment with 
different financing and delivery modes, and opt to cover 
 
 
upon ‘practical’ considerations, including ‘actual experience.’ ”  (quoting NLRB. 
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41–42 (1937))). 
 197. Id. (quoting Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 390 U.S. 90, 103 (1946)). 
 198. Id. at 2628 (“It is more than exaggeration to suggest that the minimum 
coverage provision improperly intrudes on ‘essential attributes of state 
sovereignty’ . . . . [T]he Affordable Care Act does not operate ‘in [an] are[a] such 
as criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have been 
sovereign.’ ”  (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995))). 
 199. Id. at 2629. 
 200. Id. at 2632. 
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(or not cover) a range of particular procedures and 
therapies. States have leveraged this policy discretion to 
generate a myriad of dramatically different Medicaid 
programs over the past several decades.”201
Despite the fact that Ginsburg’s opinion adopts an overt 
discourse of state empowerment and opportunity, the 
preceding statements actually perpetuate the underlying 
discourse of violence associated with the federal-state 
relationship by assuming the battle has already been fought, 
and the states have lost.  They are, in a word, conquered.  It 
is because the states have already been defeated that they 
must assume the role of subjugated servant—the faithful 
implementer of federal policies.  Thus, for all of Ginsburg’s 
talk about state autonomy and discretion, that autonomy and 
discretion is confined to choices within the acceptable range 
set forth by the federal program itself.  For Ginsburg, modern 
federalism works because there really is no more room for 
plausible dissent.  The states have not only been displaced as 
hosts, as sovereigns, their status as servants is such that they 
should feel grateful for what limited and local powers the 
federal government allows them: “States have no entitlement 
to receive Medicaid funds; they enjoy only the opportunity to 
accept funds on Congress’ terms.”
 
202
Similarly, under the guise of declaring the importance of 
the States’ role as partners, the opinion instead reinforces the 
impotency of the States vis-à-vis the Congress: 
 
Congress could have taken over the health-insurance 
market. . . . Instead, of going this route, Congress enacted 
the ACA, a solution that retains a robust role for private 
insurers and state governments.203
The alternative to conditional federal spending, it bears 
emphasis, is not state autonomy but state 
marginalization. In 1965, Congress elected to nationalize 
health coverage for seniors through Medicare. It could 
similarly have established Medicaid as an exclusively 
federal program. Instead, Congress gave the States the 
opportunity to partner with the program’s administration 
 
 
 201. Id. (quoting Theodore W. Ruger, Of Icebergs and Glaciers: The 
Submerged Constitution of American Healthcare, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
215, 233 (2012) (footnote omitted)). 
 202. Id. at 2630 (emphasis added). 
 203. Id. at 2612. 
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and development. Absent from the nationalized model, of 
course, is the state-level policy discretion and 
experimentation that is Medicaid’s hallmark; undoubtedly 
the interests of federalism are better served when States 
retain a meaningful role in the implementation of a 
program of such importance.204
The preceding statements contain a (not so) veiled threat: 
“do as you are told or get left out altogether.”  These 
statements reflect the idea that the states serve only by the 
generosity and at the pleasure of the federal government.  
And at any moment, it can all be taken away.
 
205
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion represents the cooperative 
theory of federalism grounded in three related ideas: (1) the 
Constitution established a comprehensive federal government 
endowed with the power to solve problems of collective action 
affecting the states; (2) this power creates a hierarchical 
federal-state relationship, which subordinates the states to 
the will of the federal government; and (3) the states must 
serve as faithful implementers of federal policies and 
programs. 
 
IV. HOSPITALITY PARADIGM SHIFTS FEDERALISM DISCOURSE 
FROM VIOLENCE TO PRODUCTIVE GOVERNANCE 
The drafting and ratification of the Constitution 
represented a deliberate unification in which the States and 
the newly formed Federal government had to relate to one 
another in a novel power-sharing arrangement.206
Hospitality is, in Derrida’s understanding, ultimately 
about ethics.
  Derrida 
discusses this idea of two distinct beings coming together in 
one space as “hospitality.”  Understanding Derrida’s notion of 
hospitality creates an opportunity to unsettle the taken-for-
granted relationship between host and guest in the context of 
American-style federalism. 
207
 
 204. Id. at 2632–33 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
  Taken to the extreme, hospitality—the 
opening up of one’s home to a stranger—is the fundamental 
 205. Id. at 2633 n.16 (“In 1972, for example, Congress ended the federal cash-
assistance program for the aged, blind, and disabled. That program previously 
had been operated jointly by the Federal and State Governments, as is the case 
with Medicaid today. Congress replaced the cooperative federal program with 
the nationalized Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program.”). 
 206. See generally THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 207. See DERRIDA, OF HOSPITALITY, supra note 31, at 135, 137. 
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act of ethics and of receptivity to the other.208  As social 
beings, the activity of welcoming and receiving others into our 
space may be the most “human” thing we do.  He terms this 
ethical dimension of hospitality an “unconditional 
hospitality”—a hospitality that makes no demand on the 
other and welcomes the other without knowing in advance 
who or what the other might be.209  The ethos of hospitality, 
at least in its absolute form, is dangerous and rather quickly 
becomes untenable.210  Because it implies a total welcome, 
absolute—or unconditional—hospitality places the host in the 
unenviable position of inviting the guest to displace him as 
master of the house.211
Derrida does not exalt this ethic as some practical 
objective to which all hosts should strive.  On the contrary, he 
recognizes that, as an ethic, unconditional hospitality, despite 
the lovely “human-ness” of the initial invitation to the 
stranger, is self-defeating and perhaps even fatal.
  Once that happens, the host no longer 
has anything to offer and he ceases to be a “host.”  He 
becomes the captive of his own ethic; he becomes a hostage. 
212  Instead, 
Derrida tackles this dilemma inherent in unconditional 
hospitality, by introducing the parallel concept of conditional 
hospitality.213
Just as the two notions of hospitality—the ethical 
absolute version and the political rule-governed version—
must coexist, so too must the principles that underlie the 
theories of sovereignty federalism and cooperative federalism.  
  While unconditional hospitality represents the 
ethical dimension of hospitality, conditional hospitality 
represents its political dimension: the right to welcome and 
be welcomed according to agreed-upon limits and obligations.  
This political dimension involves judicial principles and 
institutional arrangements.  The two understandings of 
hospitality correspond to the tension between ethics and 
politics in the current dominant federalism discourse, which 
can be formulated as two contradictory but (at least to their 
advocates) equally justified imperatives. 
 
 208. See id. 
 209. Id. at 135. 
 210. See id. at 25, 27. 
 211. Id. at 125; see also Mark W. Westmoreland, Interruptions: Derrida and 
Hospitality, 2 KRITIKE 1, 6 (2008). 
 212. See DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL, supra note 37, at 111. 
 213. Jacques Derrida, The Principle of Hospitality, 11 PARRALLAX 6–9 (2005). 
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It is between these two that decisions must be made.  Derrida 
refers to this search for a middle path as the quest for 
“intermediate schema.”214
A. Defects of Dominant Federalism Theory Paradigms 
  While current federalism 
arguments require one to be chosen over the other, hospitality 
shows us that the two forms are always present.  The ethics 
and politics of hospitality do not exclude one another.  To the 
contrary, each needs the other to exist; they are 
metaphysically and practically symbiotic.  Thus, it should not 
be that we select one over the other; rather, we should 
acknowledge the need for the two approaches to relate more 
to each other.  In the federalism context, conditional 
hospitality corresponds to a respect for institutional 
sovereignty subject to regulative forces, while unconditional 
hospitality corresponds to the welcoming based on a feeling of 
responsibility for others. 
The dominant federalism theory paradigms are defective, 
at least to the extent they are viewed as exclusive and 
complete.  When claims of sovereignty federalism and 
cooperative federalism are mired in violence, they no longer 
provide an adequate construct to meaningfully debate 
federal-state regulatory authority.  Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinions in Sebelius exemplify the extent 
to which violence continues to dominate the discourse that 
governs the relationship between the Federal Government 
and the States.  The Court’s homage to traditional federalism 
values is incomplete because it places the States and the 
Federal Government in a relationship, which, by its very 
structure, is adversarial.  It suggests that power is a zero-sum 
game played by the host (the States) and the guest (the 
Federal Government) from the moment of initial contact; and 
whatever the former cedes to the latter tends necessarily to 
make the latter stronger and more insatiable.  But like most 
antinomic relationships, this one is false, or at least capable 
of being upended, despite its claim to primacy and 
permanence.  As Theodore Ruger pointed out in an article 
published just after the ACA opinion came down, “the ACA 
litigation’s suggestion of an oppositional or mutually 
 
 214. DERRIDA, OF HOSPITALITY, supra note 31, at 147. 
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exclusive federalism is misleading.”215
The Court’s articulation of federalism is also 
unproductive.  In Beyond Separation in Federalism 
Enforcement: Medicaid Expansion, Coercion, and the Norm of 
Engagement, Professor Charlton Copeland points to the role 
separation of the States and the Federal Government plays in 
current federalism discourse.
 
216  He claims that the current 
dominance of separation as the underlying component 
safeguarding breaches of federalism should be replaced by 
endowing subsequent implementation of federal policy with 
significance.217  He argues that this turn from separation to 
engagement will provide a more effective basis for judging the 
balance of power (and level of coercion, if any) in the federal-
state relationship.218
To illustrate his point, Professor Copeland critiques the 
Chief Justice and Justice Ginsburg’s use of the clear 
statement rule in their coercion analysis.
 
219  The clear 
statement principle has been identified as one of the most 
important of the Dole factors in spending clause analysis 
because it requires that state knowledge and voluntary 
acceptance of conditions to federal funding can only exist 
when the terms of the conditions are explicit and 
unambiguous.220
Professor Copeland condemns both Roberts and 
Ginsburg’s Spending Clause analysis, for having “collapsed 
the clear statement requirement into their discussion of the 
 
 
 215. Theodore W. Ruger, Of Icebergs and Glaciers: The Submerged 
Constitution of American Healthcare, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 224 
(2012). 
 216. See Charlton Copeland, Beyond Separation in Federalism Enforcement: 
Medicaid Expansion, Coercion and the Norm of Engagement, 15 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 91, 91 (2012) (arguing that the focus of current federalism discourse 
on separation defined at a singular point in time between the federal and state 
governments to determine coercion does not appropriately account for the 
significant level of engagement between the two governing systems needed to 
successfully enforce, protect, and advance cooperative governance). 
 217. Id. at 100. 
 218. Id. at 100–01. 
 219. Id. at 158. 
 220. See, e.g., David E. Engdahl, The Contract Thesis of the Federal Spending 
Power, 52 S.D. L. REV. 496, 496 (2007) (arguing that the clear statement rule 
reinforces the contract metaphor of the federal-state relationship, which relies 
on explicitly stated terms as an effective exercise of state voluntariness and 
sovereignty). 
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coercion claim.”221  He claims that their reliance on the clear 
statement rule to analyze coercion in federal-state Medicaid 
relationship misses the point.222  Instead of looking at the 
totality of the federal-state Medicaid relationship for coercion, 
both Roberts and Ginsburg relied on a simplistic analysis of 
notice to determine the nature of the relationship.223  While 
focusing on different temporal aspects of the relationship as 
significant, both opinions remained mired in the dominance of 
separation as the vital component for exercises of state 
sovereignty and federalism protection.224
In addition to their focus on the clear statement 
principle, the Chief Justice and Justice Ginsburg’s treatment 
of the Medicaid program’s inception in 1965 illustrates how 
focus on a temporal point in a relationship informs one’s 
recognition of violence.  Roberts points to the investment that 
states have made over the last 47 years in developing 
“intricate statutory and administrative regimes over the 
course of many decades to implement their objectives under 
existing Medicaid.”
 
225  In doing so, he suggests that the 
manner in which the federal-state relationship develops over 
the life of a federal program is a significant (if not 
determining factor) in establishing the respective rights and 
obligations under that program.  But then Roberts veers.  
Rather than finish his argument that context should inform 
whether a proposed change in a federal program is unduly 
coercive he changes tack and concludes that the Medicaid 
expansion is coercive because it constitutes an entirely new 
program.226
Justice Ginsburg’s treatment of the subsequent 
implementation of the Medicaid program fares little better.  
While acknowledging that the Medicaid program has 
undergone significant changes over time,
  This decision to bifurcate the expansion from the 
original program creates a new battlefield on which the states 
and federal government can wage war.  A war that the Chief 
Justice concludes the states should win. 
227
 
 221. Copeland, supra note 216, at 158. 
 Justice Ginsburg 
 222. See id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. See id. at 158–61. 
 225. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012). 
 226. Id. at 2605–06. 
 227. See id. at 2631 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the 
judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
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denies that any of those subsequent changes affect the nature 
of the relationship between the federal and state governments 
for purposes of determining coercion.228  Instead, Ginsburg 
defends the Medicaid expansion provision’s constitutionality 
in terms of whether notice of authority to change the program 
was given at the beginning of the federal-state Medicaid 
relationship.229  Given that the original 1965 act provided 
notice to the states that Congress had the authority to change 
the program from time to time, Justice Ginsburg concluded 
the expansion provision was not coercive.230
While Roberts’ opinion framed the federal-state 
relationship as a series of battles, each presenting a new 
opportunity for victory and defeat, and Ginsburg framed it as 
one battle fought long ago forever cementing the federal-state 
relationship, recent scholarship has emphasized a more 
nuanced approach to the dominance of separation in 
federalism discourse.
  Justice 
Ginsburg’s analysis seeks to identify merely whether the 
technical requirements of notice have been met.  It limits the 
jurisprudential understanding of notice to the singular 
moment when the federal-state relationship as to a particular 
federal program begins.  For Ginsburg, the bargaining table 
instantiates the entire relationship between the parties for all 
time.  Each side must negotiate all aspects of the 
relationship, known and unknown, over the life of the 
relationship at the initial enacting moment, i.e., a battle once 
fought and lost cannot be refought. 
231
 
 228. Id. at 2633–34 (stating, “Congress’s authority to condition the use of 
federal funds is not confined to spending programs as first launched.  The 
legislature may, and often does, amend the law, imposing new conditions grant 
recipients henceforth must meet in order to continue receiving funds.”). 
  Much of this scholarship stresses the 
ability of states to influence federal policies through 
mechanisms of resistance.  For example, in Uncooperative 
Federalism, Professors Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather 
Gerken argue that states in the role of servant can exercise 
power against the federal government via dissent to federal 
 229. See id. at 2638. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See, e.g., JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM: HOW STATES 
PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING (2009); Jessica 
Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 
1256 (2009); Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2011); 
Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of State-based 
Dissent to Federal Health Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111 (2011). 
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policy.232  The authors argue that state dissent, in various 
forms such as opting-out of federal programs, litigation to 
challenge federal policy as unconstitutional, and enacting 
conflicting state legislation, can in some instances compel the 
federal government to be more open to state concerns and 
desires, thus stimulating a more productive dialogue between 
the federal and state governments.233  According to these 
scholars, this dialogue enables states to play a role in federal 
policymaking.234
Similarly, in Rhetorical Federalism, Professor Elizabeth 
Weeks Leonard argues that a larger, more radical menu of 
state-driven dissent may be necessary to effect a positive 
change in federal policy.
 
235  She describes “rhetorical 
federalism” as “state-centered dissent to federal programs in 
the form of refusing to implement new federal legislation, 
challenging the constitutionality of federal laws, resisting 
federal mandates, ignoring federal precedent, and even 
threatening to secede from the Union.”236  Professor Leonard 
explains, “like uncooperative federalism, rhetorical federalism 
finds value in states not simply falling in line with federal 
authorities”.237  She concludes that state-centered dissent, 
whether based on concerns about structural allocation of 
power or opportunistic desire for political benefit, is valuable 
to federal policymaking and federal-state relationships 
because it: (1) brings transparency to the task of 
implementing comprehensive laws, (2) educates the electorate 
by distilling the law to discrete issues, (3) gives voice to 
minority views, (4) depoliticizes highly charged issues, (5) 
codifies dissent, and (6) highlights the increased role of 
government in health care delivery.238
These approaches are acutely insightful.  They offer 
viable options for states to participate more fully in the 
federal policy making process by suggesting ways states can 
exploit their subordinate posture.  Nevertheless, these 
 
 
 232. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 231, at 1262. 
 233. See id. at 1271–80. 
 234. See id. at 1263, 1265. 
 235. See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of 
State-based Dissent to Federal Health Reform, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 111, 112–13 
(2011).  
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 162. 
 238. Id. at 162–67. 
CISNEROS FINAL 4/26/2014  12:21 PM 
2014] AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 65 
arguments about the empowerment of state-based resistance 
remain grounded in the violence discourse that frames our 
dominant federalism theories: a discourse that I have argued 
truncates meaningful development of a federal-state 
partnership.  Although state-centered dissent reconceives the 
states’ options for participation, it does so within the same 
constraints of the master/servant paradigm.  Instead of 
displacing this paradigm, state-centered dissent emphasizes 
the hierarchy by limiting state action to the contrarian power 
of the servant, the power merely to say “no.”  This limitation 
reifies the inherited ideal of violence as the operating norm 
for establishing and developing federal-state relations.  This 
is, however, a better alternative. 
B. From Unconditional to a Conditional Welcome 
The hospitality paradigm offers the opportunity to 
transcend the impasse of the current federalism debate by 
providing a balance between the two dominant theories.  As is 
indicated by Chief Justice Roberts’ ACA opinion, too much 
emphasis on the structural justifications of the sovereignty 
theory will tip the balance too far in favor of the states.  As 
Justice Ginsburg’s ACA opinion indicates, too much emphasis 
on the political justifications of cooperative federalism will tip 
the balance too far in favor of the federal government.  Each 
approach is skewed and continually reinforces the operation 
of violence within the federal-state relationship.  Although 
hospitality acknowledges violence, it goes beyond that 
violence to consider balanced cooperation through mutually-
agreed upon conditions.  Hospitality reconciles these 
divergent theories of federalism by requiring respect for 
sovereignty while recognizing the significance of the actual 
federal-state relationship developed through implementation 
of government regulatory programs.  Thus, the hospitality 
norm is capable of reorienting the debate about federalism. 
Hospitality is often taken for granted as something we do 
to be kind to others.  However, as discussed in this article, it 
is an ambiguous notion full of contradictions.  Derrida 
demonstrates how the head of the house, to offer hospitality 
and welcome a stranger through the door, must maintain 
control and ownership of the home—i.e., sovereignty.  It 
requires the right to a particular place and it involves power 
and inequality in the relation between the host and the 
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guest—the very things that are anathema to pure, absolute, 
ethical hospitality.  Even if the initial welcome is framed as 
unconditional, Derrida shows how welcoming someone into 
your home can challenge your sovereignty over that place and 
the feeling of being sidelined as the host can change your 
attitude toward the guest.  Being a host implies a temporary 
relationship and when the guest does not leave, the attitude 
towards the guest tends to change.  This feeling of losing 
control over one’s home makes it necessary to reassert 
control.  For Derrida, this double imperative of hospitality 
means that the relationship with the other takes place in the 
tension between conditional and unconditional hospitality. 
The Derridean principle of hospitality exposes the 
weakness of much of the current dominant federalism 
discourse and offers an alternative.  Violence does not have to 
be the primary frame for federalism discourse.  Derrida’s 
principles of hospitality provide a framework through which 
to conceive a discourse of Federalism that accounts for but is 
not dominated by violence.  Absolute/unconditional 
hospitality accounts for violence by acknowledging that the 
guest may overtake the host because the host cannot set 
limits.  In this sense, achieving unconditional hospitality is 
impossible because hospitality requires the host to retain 
sovereignty.  Conditional hospitality, however, occurs in the 
pursuit of this “impossibility.”  Conditional hospitality is 
achieved by allowing the host to set limits on the guest, 
thereby retaining sovereignty, yet allowing for mutually 
beneficial interaction between host and guest.  In a very real 
sense, power allocation becomes reciprocal from the very 
beginning of the discourse. 
Similarly, while either theory of federalism in the 
absolute would destroy federalism because it would require 
either the federal government or the states to relinquish their 
sovereignty, conditional federalism would account for 
violence, but displace it from its primary status.  This 
displacement, which acknowledges violence only in a 
secondary sense, would instead privilege the political 
relationship and power allocations indicated by the provisions 
of the federal programs themselves.  The political 
relationships and power allocations could be construed using 
the host/guest discourse.  The host/guest language-frame 
allows for acceptance of entry, retention of sovereignty, and 
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the right to establish (negotiate) conditions on access.  The 
host/guest language frame enables federalism analysis to 
take place within a dialogue of shared partnership rather 
than one of subjugation and violence. 
CONCLUSION 
Thinking of federalism as a form of “hospitality” requires 
that states become active participants in the federal 
policymaking process.  From Derrida’s discussions of 
hospitality we can learn that hospitality engagements should 
take place as a double imperative of unconditionality and 
conditionality.  Allowing for the negotiations between 
conditional and unconditional hospitality, and for both 
understandings of sovereignty and collective action problems 
to prevail requires opening up the different approaches to 
federalism analysis.  Conflicts between federal and state 
regulatory authority are unlikely to abate.  The traditional 
federalism discourse is no longer adequate to sustain a debate 
about the operation of the federal-state relationship.  The 
hospitality paradigm has the potential to unsettle the 
inherited understanding of that relationship and reorient our 
conception of federalism in a way that is meaningful to 
assessing government regulation addressing twenty-first 
century problems. 
 
